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We show that the very characteristics of educational systems generate social segmentation. A stylised 
educational framework is constructed in which everyone receives a compulsory basic education and can 
subsequently choose between direct working, vocational studies and university. There is a selection for 
entering the university which consists of a minimum human capital level at the end of basic education. In 
the model, an individual’s human capital depends (i) on her/his parents’ human capital, (ii) on her/his 
schooling time, and (iii) on public expenditure for education. There are three education functions 
corresponding to each type of study (basic, vocational, university). Divergences in total educational 
expenditure, in its distribution between the three studies and in the selection severity, combined with the 
initial distribution of human capital across individuals, can result in very different social segmentations 
and generate under education traps (situations in which certain dynasties remain unskilled from generation 
to generation) at the steady state. We finally implement a series of simulations that illustrate these findings 
in the cases of egalitarian and elitist educational systems. Assuming the same initial distribution of human 
capital between individuals, we find that the first system results in two-segment stratification, quasi 
income equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three segments, 
significant inequality and a large under education trap.  
JEL Classification: E24, H52, I21.  




In the economic literature, the impact of human capital acquisition upon social 
segmentation has been analysed through the emergence of under education traps, i.e., 
situations in which a proportion of the population remains unskilled from generation to 
generation.  
In the early approach of Becker and Tomes (1979) with a perfectly competitive 
credit market, all the dynasties converge towards the same human capital in the long 
term. Assuming credit market imperfections, Loury (1981) and Becker and Tomes 
(1986) show that this convergence still holds but it is slowed down, thereby creating a 
'low mobility trap' (Piketty, 2000).  
These rather optimistic diagnoses were subsequently questioned by a number of 
works that analysed the emergence of under education traps. Several determinants can 
cause the emergence of such traps: a credit constraint with a fixed cost of education 
(Galor and Zeira, 1993, Barham et al., 1995), an S-shaped education function (Galor and 
Tsiddon, 1997), a neighbourhood effect resulting from local externalities (Benabou, 
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1993, 1996a, 1996b; Durlauf 1994, 1996), limited parental altruism (Das, 2007) etc. In 
most of these works, the trap results from non convexities that make certain individuals 
select low education. However, these approaches typically suppose that the institutional 
access to education is equally guaranteed. Financial constraints, family and social 
characteristics and limited abilities are then the main factors that explain the differences 
in educational choices and the related social segmentation.  
However, since Weber (1906), the sociological literature has drawn attention to 
the fact that the educational system itself can create social segmentation (Bidwell and 
Friedkin, 1988, for an early review). It has been underlined that the type of knowledge 
that is promoted corresponds to the cultural backgrounds of the children from the 
upper and middle classes (Sorokin, 1959; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970; Baudelot and 
Establet, 1971) and that families from the lower classes overestimate the cost of and 
underestimate the return from education (Boudon, 1973, 1974). In addition, because of 
better information and network effects, the children from higher classes select better 
educational strategies, and they have access to better positions than children from lower 
classes even when they possess the same degree (Anderson, 1961; Boudon, 1973, 1974; 
Thelot, 1982). Finally, a number of analysts have emphasised the influence of the 
selection pattern, i.e. the very structure of the educational system, on the formation and 
the persistence of social segmentation (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970; Bowles and 
Gintis, 1976). Several recent empirical studies confirm the impact of the educational 
system upon social stratification. Using data from an international survey, Shavit and 
Muller (2000) find that the institutional characteristics of the school systems partly 
explain the differences in educational and occupational attainment across countries. 
Similarly, by comparing the transition from school to work in France, Germany, the UK 
and the US, Kerckhoff (2000) concludes that the differences across these countries are 
partially due to the differences in their educational systems.  
If sociologists have studied for a long time the impact of hierarchical educational 
systems upon social stratification, this has only recently been investigated by the 
economic theory. Driskill and Horowitz (2002) and Su (2004) analyse hierarchical 
educational systems by focusing on the allocation of public funding between basic and 
advanced education. They study the impacts upon growth, welfare and income 
distribution, but not on social stratification. Bertocchi and Spagat (2004) model a three-
level educational system (basic education and secondary education divided between 
vocational and general studies) so as to analyse social stratification during the different 
stages of economic development. However, their approach does not generate lasting 
under education trap because workers without secondary education disappear with the 
vanishing of the traditional sector.  
Our objective is to analyse the impact of the structure of the educational system, 
i.e., the way the courses of study are organised with their different stages, divisions, 
selection procedures and funding, upon the formation and the intergenerational 
persistence of social segmentation. 
The starting point of the analysis consists in a simplified stylised picture of the 
education systems that exist in most of the countries. These educational patterns exhibit 
rather similar structures, with however significant differences in the weight and funding 
devoted to each stage and in the severity of the selection procedures (see Tavares, 1995, 
for a description of the European systems in the mid-nineties). Compulsory schooling is  
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enforced until the age of 15-18 in advanced countries, and until 12-15 years old in most 
of the developing countries. After compulsory schooling, young adults can either join 
the labour market, or pursue their studies. In the latter case, they typically face two 
courses of study. They can firstly select vocational studies. If such studies do exist in all 
countries, their shape and entry conditions significantly differ between as well as within 
countries. Usually, the access to vocational study does not require the obtainment of a 
final degree that sanctions secondary schooling (A-Level, Abitur, Baccalaureat etc.), 
even if this is the case for certain technical studies. In addition, vocational studies 
typically begin at upper secondary school level and can be part of an apprenticeship 
system. A second course of study consists in going to university, i.e., the tertiary 
educational system. Entering a university typically requires the obtainment of a degree 
that sanctions secondary school, and additional selection procedures are often enforced.  
We firstly construct a simple stylised model that can describe this general 
educational framework, and that can be declined into various configurations. From this 
general model, we derive several possible social segmentations depending on the 
characteristics of the educational system. We finally implement a series of simulations 
that illustrate different social segmentations resulting from different educational 
systems.  
The article is original in several respects. It firstly develops an intergenerational 
theoretical framework that allows modelling the impact of the structure of the 
educational system upon social segmentation. Secondly, the model generates social 
segmentations that depend on both the educational system and the initial distribution of 
human capital between households. Finally, different educational systems result in 
different segmentations for the same initial distribution of human capital. 
The main features of the educational general framework are presented in section 
2. The educational choices of individuals are analysed in section 3. The characteristics of 
the educational systems and the related social segmentations are determined in section 4. 
Section 5 analyses the human capital dynamics and the resulting segmentation. A series 
of simulations are implemented in section 6. We conclude in section 7.  
2.   The model general framework 
2.1. Production 
The economy produces one good with technology YH ω = ,  j j j Ht h =∑ ,  j h  
being the human capital of individual j and  j t  her/his time spent in the production 
activity. By assuming perfect competition on the market for goods, the profit is nil at 
equilibrium and ω  is the before tax wage per unit of human capital×time. As a 
consequence, individual j earns the pre-tax income  j jj ht ω ω = .  
2.2. Individuals and Education 
We consider a succession of generations with the same number M of individuals. 
The successive generations linked by a parent-child relationship form a dynasty.   
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An individual’s life comprises two periods. Being young, s/he receives a basic 
education. Being adult, s/he lives one period of length 1 that s/he can divide between 
higher education and work.  
The government provides individuals with both basic and higher education. 
Public education is funded by a tax on the parents' income at rate τ . The after tax wage 
per unit of human capital×time is thus  (1 ) w τ ω = − .  
Basic education is compulsory and this provides individuals with the human 
capital necessary to get access to the labour market. In contrast, pursuing higher 
education is a choice of the individual who takes her/his decision by comparing the 
related income benefit and cost. Albeit spending the same time in basic education, 
individuals differ in their human capital at the end of this time. This is because intra-
family externalities make children from more educated families more able to acquire the 
provided education. In addition, it is assumed that the market for credit is perfect and 
that the interest rate is nil
4. These assumptions are tailored so as to place individuals in 
the most favourable situation in their choice for higher education, and thereby to focus 
on the sole impacts (i) of the uneven distribution of human capital across parents and 
(ii) of the educational structure, on the emergence of social stratifications.  
At the end of basic education, an individual can choose, either to join directly the 
labour market, or to pursue further education. In the latter case, two courses of study 
are open that are exclusive of each other. The individual can firstly choose vocational 
studies (denoted V) without any constraint in terms of human capital attainment at the 
end of basic education. S/He can also go to university (denoted U) if her/his human 
capital at the end of basic education is at least  U λ .  
2.3. Education functions 
Basic education produces individual j's human capital according to the following 
function: 
() (1 ) jB j h
η
λδ − =           ( 1 )    
B δ  denotes the productivity in basic education that depends on the government's 
educational policy. Expression ( ) (1 ) j h
η
− depicts the intra-family externality, i.e., the 
impact of the parent’s human capital  (1 ) j h −  on her/his child’s human capital at the end 
of basic education. We suppose that the marginal impact of the intra-family externality is 
decreasing, i.e. 01 η < < .  
The education function in higher education i,  , iV U =  is 
{ } max , i
j ij i j j he
ε δ λλ = , with  i δ  being the productivity and  ji e  individual j's schooling 
                                                 
4 Assuming a discount factor (non zero interest rate) would not change the model outcome.   
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time in higher education i, and 01 i ε < < . When effective, i.e. for  i
ij i j j e
ε δ λλ > , higher 
education of type i thus depends: 
1)  on the productivity  i δ  in higher education i, that is produced by the 
educational policy,  
2)  on the time  ji e  spent for studying in i with decreasing returns because 
01 i ε < < , and  
3)  on the already acquired basic education  j λ .  
Pursuing higher education induces a fixed cost  f  paid by the individual and 
assumed to be identical for both types of higher education for the sake of simplicity. 
This cost consists in a fixed amount of goods, so that 
1 (1 ) f kw k ωτ
− =×= −  , with 
k  being the fixed amount of human capital utilised in terms of the fixed cost of 
education. There is a minimum schooling time for higher education to be effective 
( i
ij i j j e




− > . This condition is always fulfilled at the individual’s 
optimum because further education is only chosen if the related lifetime income is 
higher than that from direct working  (1 ) i
jii j i j j we e f w




− > . The education function in study  , iV U =  can thus be written: 
()
1/ (1 )             
                               
ii





η ε ε δδ δ
λ




         (2) 
A low  i ε  signifies that the marginal gain from education decreases fast, and thus 
that the knowledge available from the study of type i can be captured rapidly. In return, 
with a high  i ε  it is necessary to spend more time to acquire the human capital provided 
by study i. We suppose that  VU ε ε < , i.e., that more time is necessary to acquire the 
knowledge provided by the university than that provided by vocational studies.  
The set of possible educational choices is not the same for all individuals. All of 
them have access to vocational studies, whereas only these with a human capital higher 
than  U λ  at the end of basic education can enter the university. Figure 1 depicts the 
individual's choices according to the entry conditions in each type of study.  
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Figure 1. The individual's choices at the end of basic education 
 
 
As individual j' s human capital at the end of basic education is totally determined 
by relation  () (1 ) jB j h
η
λδ − = , it is possible to rewrite the entry condition in university 
in terms of her/his parent's human capital. As a consequence, only individuals whose 
parent's human capital is higher than  ( )
1/
/ UU B h
η
λδ =  can enter the university.  
3. Educational choices  
Let us consider individual j endowed with human capital  j λ  at the end of basic 
education. S/He chooses the educational pattern that maximises her/his lifetime 
income. If s/he chooses not to proceed with further education her/his lifetime income 
is  j wλ , and s/he earns  (1 ) i
ji i ji j wee f
ε δλ −−  if s/he selects education i, i = V,U.  
To determine the individual's educational choice, we firstly suppose that s/he 
pursues higher education and we calculate her/his related optimal schooling time. 
Afterwards, we compare the three possible choices (no further education, vocational 
study and university), and we select the strategy that maximises the individual's lifetime 
earning. 
3.1. Schooling time 
Lemma 1: An individual who selects higher education i, i = V,U, allows time  ˆi e  
to this education, with:  
ˆ /( 1 ) ii i e ε ε =+           ( 3 )  
Proof: By maximising  (1 ) i
ji i ji j wee f
ε δλ − − with respect to  ji e  .  
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Since  VU ε ε < , the time allowed for vocational study  ˆ /( 1 ) VV V e ε ε = +  is lower 
than that allocated to university  ˆ /( 1 ) UU U e ε ε = + . 
3.2. Educational choices 
Henceforth, we adopt the following notations: 
/(1 )











         ( 4 )  
/(1 )
'











         ( 5 )  
We denote h  and  ' h  the parents’ human capital corresponding to the basic 




λδ =  and  ( )
1/
'' / B h
η
λδ = . 
Lemma 2: Individual j earns more (less) by working directly than by making 
vocational studies if  j λ λ <  ( j λ λ > ) and s/he earns more (less) by working 
directly than by entering the university if  ' j λ λ <  ( ' j λ λ > ). 
Proof: Individual j earns more by working directly than by selecting study i, i = 
V,U, if the former provides her/him with a lifetime income higher than that given by 
study i, i.e.  ˆˆ (1 ) i
ii i j j we e f w
ε δ λλ −− < . The conditions on  j λ  are obtained by inserting 
1 (1 ) f wk τ
− =−  into this inequality.  
The related conditions on individual j’s parent human capital  (1 ) j h −  are (i) 
(1 ) j hh − <  for higher earnings from direct working than from vocational studies, and 
(ii)  (1 ) ' j hh − <  for higher earnings from direct working than from entering the 
university. 
Lemma 3: All individuals prefer the university to vocational studies if  ' λ λ >  
(equivalently  ' hh > ), they all prefer vocational studies to the university if  ' λ λ <  
( ' hh < ), and both choices are equivalent for everyone if  ' λ λ =  (  ' hh = ). 
Proof: Individuals prefer university to vocational studies if the former provides a 
higher lifetime income than the latter:  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UV
UU U j VV V j we e we e
εε δ λδ λ −> − , i.e. 
ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) ' ' UV
UU U VV V ee ee hh
εε δδ λ λ −> − ⇔ > ⇔ > . Similarly, they prefer vocational  
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studies to university if  '' ' hh λλ <⇔ < , and both choices provide the same lifetime 
income if  '' hh λλ =⇔ =. 
Proposition 1: Consider individual j with human capital  j λ  at the end of basic 
education. Then: 
1)  Individual j joins directly the labour market (i) when  j λ λ <  and  ' j λ λ <  , 
or (ii) when  ' j λ λ λ ≤<  and  j U λ λ < . 
2)  Individual j selects vocational studies (i) when  ' j λ λλ ≤ < , or (ii) when 
' j λ λλ ≥>  and  j U λ λ < . 
3)  Individual j enters the university when  ' j λ λ ≥ ,  ' λ λ >  and  j U λ λ ≥ . 
Case (1) corresponds to the two situations in which the individual directly joins 
the labour market. In the first, doing this provides her/him with higher income than 
selecting, either vocational studies or the university (because  j λ λ <  and  ' j λ λ < , see 
Lemma 2). In the second, the individual’s income is higher when working directly than 
when pursuing vocational studies and lower when working directly than when studying 
in the university ( j λ λ <  and  ' j λ λ ≥ , see Lemma 2), but this last option is impossible 
because her/his human capital at the end of basic education is lower than  U λ . 
Case (2) depicts the two situations in which the individual selects vocational 
studies. In the first, vocational studies provide her/him with a higher income than both 
direct working and university ( j λ λ ≥  and  ' j λ λ < , Lemma 2). In the second, vocational 
studies is preferred to direct working ( j λ λ ≥ , Lemma 2), but less profitable than 
university ( ' λ λ > , Lemma 3), with this last choice being unachievable because of a lack 
of human capital at the end of basic education ( j U λ λ < ). 
Finally, case (3) describes the situation in which the individual chooses the 
university. This is when this choice provides her/him with a higher income than both 
direct working ( ' j λ λ ≥ , Lemma 2) and vocational studies ( ' λ λ > , Lemma 3), with 
her/his human capital at the end of basic education being enough to enter this type of 
study.   
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By replacing the λ s by the related parent’s human capital  ()
1/
(1 ) / B h
η λδ −= , we 
obtain the corollary proposition: 
Corollary: Consider individual j whose parent’s human capital is  (1 ) j h − . Then: 
1)  Individual j joins directly the labour market (i) when  (1 ) j hh − <  and 
(1 ) ' j hh − <  , or (ii) when  (1 ) ' j hh h − ≤ <  and  (1 ) j U hh − < . 
2)  Individual j selects vocational studies (i) when  (1 ) ' j hh h − ≤ < , or (ii) 
when  (1 ) ' j hh h − ≥>  and  (1 ) j U hh − < . 
3)  Individual j enters the university when  (1 ) ' j hh − ≥ ,  ' hh >  and 
(1 ) j U hh − ≥ . 
Finally, the following feature can be established when both V and V are 
concurrently chosen inside a generation.  
Lemma 4: Within the same generation, the coexistence of individuals who prefer 
V to V and individuals who prefer V to V is impossible. Consequently, if both V 
and V are selected within the same generation, then, either all the individuals who 
select V are constrained by the entry threshold  U λ , or all individuals have the 
same lifetime earning when choosing V and U.  
Proof: see Appendix 1. 
4. Educational systems and segmentation 
4.1. Educational Systems 
The education functions (1) and (2) and the individuals' educational choices 
depend on the values  i δ ,  ,, iB V U = . The educational policy determines these values 












         ( 6 )   




















,  , iV U =         ( 7 )  
i q  is the proportion of total levies allocated to education i ( 1 BVU qqq ++= ), 
1 y−  the total income per capita in the parents' generation,  i µ  the proportion of the 
current generation involved in study i (since all the individuals follow basic education, 
1 B µ = ) ,  B e  the compulsory schooling time, and coefficients  i δ  indicate the efficiency 
of public spending in the i-study. It can be noted that, unlike  V δ  and  U δ ,  B δ  integrates 
the compulsory schooling time in basic education because this is part of the educational 
policy and because it was not accounted for in the basic education function (1). We also 
assume  01 β << , which indicates that the marginal impact of public spending on 
education is decreasing. 
To provide an interpretation of function (7), let us rewrite it 
() 1 ˆ / ii i i i qY M e
β δδ τ µ − = , where  1 Y−  is the total income of the parents' generation and 
M the number of dynasties. The productivity in the i-study depends (i) positively on the 
amount of levies  1 i qY τ −  allocated to i, and (ii) negatively on the number  iM µ  of 
students involved in i and on the length  ˆi e  of this course of study. Expression 
() 1 ˆ / ii i qY M e τµ −  is thus the public expense for education i per pupil×schooling time.  
Definition 1: We call 'Educational System ( ) ,,,,, BVUUB qqq e τλ ' the educational 
pattern that allocates levies  1 0 Y τ − >  to the three types of studies (B,V,U) in the 
proportions  0 B q > ,  0 V q ≥ , and  0 U q ≥ , with the entry conditions  U λ  in the 
university and the compulsory schooling time in basic education  0 B e > , the 
public education productivity functions (6) and (7) being given.  
Features  1 0 Y τ − > ,  0 B q >  and  0 B e >  are necessary for the existence of the 
educational system. In addition, a necessary condition for an educational system to be 
efficient is  00 ii q µ =⇒ = for i = V,U. This condition signifies that there is no waste 
of public spending: if nobody chooses study i, then the social planner does not allocate 
funds to this study. Henceforth, we suppose that the social planner never allocates 
funds to a study which is chosen by no-one. 
We denote  () B
TB B B Ae q
β εβ δ τ
− ≡ ,  () ˆ V
VT V V V AAe q
β εβ δ τ
− ≡ , and 
() ˆ U
UT U U U AAe q
β εβ δ τ
− ≡ . These values are constant for a given educational system.  
We also denote  , j k h ,  ,, kT V U = , the human capital of individual j whose highest 
skill is k, where T (for Trap, see hereafter) denotes that the individual has only received 
basic education, i.e., that s/he joins directly the labour market after compulsory  
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schooling. Consequently, the education functions are (by inserting (6) and (7) into (1) 
and (2)): 
() ,1 (1 ) jT T j hA y h
η β
− − =          ( 8 )  
() ()
2
,1 (1 ) () ji i i j hAty h
η β β µ
−
− − = , i = V,U       ( 9 )  













>= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
; everyone prefers vocational studies to university if 











=  . 
Proof: see Appendix 2.  
4.2. Segmentation and under-education trap 
Segmentation occurs when the individuals inside a generation are divided between 
several segments (groups) in terms of educational choice and there is an under education 
trap if certain individuals do not pursue higher education. In the model developed here, 
there are three possible segments, T (under education trap), V (individuals selecting 
vocational studies) and V (individuals entering the university). The segmentation can be 
transitory or lasting. In the first case, certain segments tend to disappear with time. 
Definition 2: There is a permanent segmentation if the proportions i µ ,  ,, iT V U = , 
are constant over time.  
The case of permanent segmentation refers to a segmentation that is unchanged 
over time, which signifies that the number of segments and the number of dynasties in 
each segment remain constant. Permanent segmentation covers two cases. In the first, 
the economy tends towards a steady state in terms of human capital distribution and 
there is thus steady state segmentation. The population is then divided between several 
skill groups, the number of groups and the number of individuals inside each group 
remaining unchanged, and each group being characterised by one constant level of 
human capital at the steady state. In the second case, the human capital and the related 
income per capita increase or decrease from generation to generation (there is thus no 
steady state), but the distribution of the dynasties between the existing segments remains 
unchanged over time.   
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There is thus a permanent under education trap if there is a permanent social 
segmentation such that  0 T µ > . In a situation of permanent under education trap, a 
constant number of dynasties remain at the basic education level from generation to 
generation. In the case of steady state segmentation, all these dynasties possess the same 
constant human capital. 
4.3. Segmentation characteristics  
A segmentation pattern is characterised by three different dimensions: 
1)  The number of segments; 
2)  The weight of each segment as a percentage of the working population; 
3)  The gaps between the segments in terms of human capital and income. 
Acting on these three dimensions through the determinants of the educational 
system participates in a policy that concerns social inequality. We do not directly address 
this issue, which would require the choice of a social welfare function, and thus a level 
of inequality aversion and a time preference (since we have a succession of generations). 
We just analyse the impact of the educational system determinants 
() ,,,,, BVUUB qqq e τλ  and of the real product per capita on the aforementioned 
characteristics.  
Firstly, the number of individuals inside the under education trap tends (i) to 
decrease with a rise in shares  B q  and  V q  of the levies allowed for basic education and 
vocational studies, (ii) to decrease with the income per capita  1 y− , and (iii) to increase 
with the fixed cost of education k  (proofs in Appendix 3). It can be noted that the 
increase in  V q  is more efficient to reduce the trap that the increase in  B q . Finally, the 
impact of the tax rate τ  is ambiguous because a rise in τ  firstly increases  B δ  and  V δ , 
which reduces the trap, but it also makes further education less profitable by raising its 
real fixed cost  /(1 ) k τ − . 
Secondly, the number of individuals that would like to enter the university and are 
prevented from this by the level of their human capital at the end of basic education is 
(i) reduced by a decrease in the selection threshold  U λ , (ii) reduced by an increase in the 
share of total levies allocated to basic education  B q  , and (iii) reduced by an increase in 
the tax rate τ  and in the gross income per dynasty  1 y−  of the parents' generation (see 
proofs in Appendix 4).  
Finally, it can be noted that an increase in  B q  tends both to reduce the under 
education trap and to increase the number of young that are allowed to enter the 
university, which underlines the crucial impact of basic education.  
In terms of income gap, it is clear that the individuals inside the under education 
trap have a lower lifetime income than these who pursue vocational studies. We show 
hereafter that the individuals from vocational studies always have a lower lifetime 
income than these from the university.  
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5. Dynamics, steady states and resulting segmentation  
5.1. Steady States 
We suppose that the number of individuals M is large enough so that the impact 
of any individual on total human capital H, and thus on the income per capita y, is 
negligible. From (8) and (9), we can write the human capital intergenerational mobility 
functions corresponding to the three possible choices of the individuals: 
•  If the individual does not pursue further education and stands in the under 
education trap: 
() 1 () ( 1 ) jT tj tt hA y h
η β
− − =         ( 1 0 )  
•  If the individual selects vocational studies: 
() ( )
2
1 () () ( 1 ) jV t V j tt t hA y h
η β β µ
−
− − =       ( 1 1 )  
•  If the individual enters the university: 
() ( )
2
1 () () ( 1 ) jU t U j t ht Ay ht
η β β µ
−
− =−       ( 1 2 )  









ˆ (1 ) VV V t T t
k
ht







⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟ =
⎜⎟ −− ⎝⎠















        ( 1 4 )  
Finally, the product per capita at time t is: 
                                                 
5 These functions are built by inserting (6) and (7) into  ()
1/ / B h
η λδ =  and  ()
1/ / UU B h
η λδ = .   
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() () () () ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) jV kU l
jT kV lU





⎜⎟ =+ − + −
⎜⎟
⎝⎠
∑∑ ∑      (15) 
The three intergenerational dynamics are depicted on Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The three intergenerational dynamics 
 
 
Let us suppose that  '( ) ( ) ht h t <  so that the university brings a higher lifetime 
income than vocational studies. On Figure 2, all the individuals whose parents human 
capital stands beneath  () ht follow the dynamics situated on curve T, all these with a 
human capital of their parents located between  () ht and  () U ht  follow dynamics V, 
and those with parents above  () U ht  follow dynamics U. At the next generation (t+1) 
the curves T, V and V as well as the thresholds  () ht and  () U ht  are shifting. These 
moves depend on the product per capita at the preceding generation  1 t y −  that varies as 
long as the economy has not reached a steady state. When  1 t y −  increases (decreases), 
curves  T, V and V move upwards (downwards) and  () ht and  () U ht  decrease 
(increase). In addition, these directly depend (except curve T and  () U ht ) on the 
distribution of the dynasties across the segment in the current generation, which 
changes over time when certain dynasties pass from one segment to another because of 
the changes in the curves and the thresholds.   
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Proposition 2: Consider Educational System ( ) ,,,,, B VUUB qqq e τλ  and the set 
of values  () { } ˆ ˆ ,,  , , ii hi T V U µ =   , ˆ ˆ 0 ii h µ ≥ ,  ˆ 1 i µ = ∑ ,  0 k q >  if  ˆ 0 k µ > , 
 , kV U = , and such that: 
1)  ()
1/1 ˆ ˆ TT hA y
η β −
= ,  ( )
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ VVV hA y
η ββ µ
− − = , and 
()
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ UUU hA y
η ββ µ
− − =  with 




/(1 ) ˆ ˆ



























 if  ˆ 0 U µ >  ; 
4)  if both  ˆˆ ,0 VU µ µ > , then (i) 
1






η − ⎛⎞ −













≤ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 if  ˆ ˆ
VU hh < , and (ii) 
1






η − ⎛⎞ −













= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 if  ˆ ˆ
VU hh ≥ . 
Then,  () { } ˆ ˆ ,,  , , ii hi T V U µ =  define a steady state of Educational System 
( ) ,,,,, B VUUB qqq e τλ . 
 
Proof: Feature (1):  ˆ
T h ,  ˆ
V h  and  ˆ
U h  are respectively the steady states of dynamics 
(10), (11) and (12). Feature (2) stipulates that all the individuals inside the trap have no 
interest to pursue vocational studies and Feature (3) that all these who enter the 
university have enough human capital to do this. Features (4) give the conditions for the 
dynasties inside V to stay inside V and the dynasties inside V to stay inside V (see the 
proof in Appendix 5). 
Lemma 6: At the steady state, the lifetime income is always lower for the 
dynasties in segment V than for these in segment U. 
Proof: See Appendix 5.  
It must be noted (i) that the same educational system typically results in several 
steady states depending on the initial distribution of human capital across dynasties, and 
(ii) that it can lead to no steady state.   
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5.2. Possible steady states and resulting segmentations 
From the dynamics (10)-(12), several features may be identified:  
(i)  The functions defining the three dynamics being concave, there is a 
convergence of the different individuals towards the same human 
capital level inside each segment T, V and U.  
(ii)  During the dynamics, certain individuals typically pass from one 
segment to another. Consequently, for an initial distribution of human 
capital across the individuals, there are educational systems that cannot 
be maintained. This is because, after a number of generations, certain 
studies disappear as no-one chooses them any longer. Then, the 
efficiency condition ( 0 i q =  if  0 i µ = ,  , iV U = ) makes that the initial 
educational system must be cancelled. 
(iii)  The long term evolution critically depends on the variation in the 
product per capita  1 t y − . For the individuals who select vocational 
studies or university, they also depend on the changes in the 
proportions  V µ  and  U µ  of individuals in each type of study.  
The analysis of the different dynamics and of their possible outcomes is described 
in Appendix 6. These dynamics depend on the values of 2β η +  and β η + . From this 
analysis, we derive the following three propositions.  
Proposition 3: Assume Educational System ( ) ,,,,, B VUUB qqq e τλ  with  0 i q > , 
, iV U = , and education functions such that 21 β η + < . Then, the human capital 
dynamics can lead to the following outcomes: 
1) Stable Steady states with three segments. 
2) Stable steady states with the two segments V and U.  
3) A withdrawal of the Educational System.  
Proposition 4: Assume an Educational System ( ) ,,,,, BVUUB qqq e τλ  and 
education functions such that 21 β η + = . Then, the human capital dynamics can 
lead to: 
1) A stable steady state if and only if  0, , i qi V U = =  
2) A two-group (V and U) permanent segmentation, with the same steady growth 
rate of the product per capita.  
3) A withdrawal of the educational system. 
4) Unstable steady states, this outcome being nevertheless very unlikely. 
Proposition 5: Assume an Educational System ( ) ,,,,, B VUUB qqq e τλ  and 
education functions such that 21 β η + > . Then, the human capital dynamics can  
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lead to: 
1) A stable steady state if and only if  0, , i qi V U = =  and  1 β η + <  
2) If  0, , i qi V U = =  and  1 β η + > , either a collapse of the economy (i.e. a 
continuous decrease of human capital and the product per capita), or an unstable 
steady state, or explosive growth. 
3) If  0,     i qi V U >= and /or , either an unstable steady state, or explosive growth, 
or a withdrawal of the educational system.  
4) In the case of explosive growth with  0, , i qi V U >= , a permanent two-group 
segmentation with the same growth rates and the same lifetime income in both 
segments. 
6. Simulations 
We now implement a series of simulations that illustrate the divergent impacts of 
different educational patterns upon social segmentation. In this purpose, we apply three 
educational systems to the same economy. These must not be seen as depicting existing 
systems but rather as portraying two ideal-types, i.e., one egalitarian system (E) and one 
inequality-oriented and elitist system (I), and a system in-between (M for medium). The 
egalitarian system E is pro-education (high public funding), with a rather slight selection 
and a balanced distribution of taxes across the three courses of study (B, V and U). In 
the elitist system I, public funding for education is rather low, selection is severe and a 
substantial part of educational funding goes to a narrow elite. System M is in-between. 
We start from a certain distribution of human capital and we simulate the 
intergenerational impact of these three systems. 
The egalitarian system results in the disappearing of the under-education trap (i.e., 
two segments) and in quasi income equality at the steady state. The second system 
generates three segments with a large under education trap and high inequalities in terms 
of skill and income. Finally, the third system generates two segments (no trap), quasi 
equality in the long term, and educational levels that stand in between the two first.  
6.1. Initial characteristics and the educational systems parameters 
We consider an education function such that 21 β η + < . This can lead, either to 
steady states of different shapes (2 or 3 segments), or to the withdrawal from the 
educational system (Proposition 3).  
The education functions parameters are depicted in Table 1 and the educational 
system characteristics in Table 2.   
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Table 1. The economy's parameters 
ω  η   β   B ε   V ε   U ε   k   B δ   V δ   U δ  
1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2  0.025 2.5 2  3 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Educational Systems 
System  τ   B q   V q   U q   B e   U µ   ˆV e   ˆU e   U λ  
E 0.07  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.091  0.166  0.9212
I  0.04  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.05  0.091  0.166  0.8723
M 0.055 0.7  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.091  0.166  0.9336
 
Coefficient  η  is chosen to correspond to the lower values given by the 
estimations of the elasticity of individual skill with respect to the parents’ skill (see 
Solon, 1999). The parameters  B ε ,  V ε ,  U ε ,  k  are selected so as to produce results 
consistent with observed facts in terms of schooling time for each stage of education (8-
10 years for basic education, 2-3 years for vocational studies and about 5 years for 
university) and in terms of fixed cost (Table 1).  
The egalitarian system E allocates 7% of total income to education, and its 
selection procedure is rather slight since it allows 20% of the first generation to enter 
the university. System E distributes levies between the three types of studies in the 
proportion  B q = 0.7,  V q =0.1 and  U q = 0.2, i.e. a large proportion of public 
expenditures allowed for basic education.  
The elitist system I allocates 4% of total income to education, restricts the entry to 
the universities to 5% of the first generation (time 1), and it allows a rather large part of 
the levies to the universities (30%) at the expense of basic education.  
Finally, system M allocates 5.5% of the total income for education, the levies 
being distributed in the same proportions as in case E with however only 10% of the 
first generation entering the university because of the selection threshold  U λ .  
It can be noted that these proportions are in line with those observed in Europe 
and the US, in which (i) public expenditure for education represents between 4-5% of 
the GDP (Greece, Italy, Spain) and 7-8% (Denmark, Sweden), and (ii) the share of 
tertiary education in total education expenditure is between 19% (Italy) and 33% 
(Denmark, Finland)
6.  
The levels of  B δ ,  V δ  and  U δ  are selected to obtain 70% of the individuals with 
basic education only, 20% in vocational studies and 10% in the university in the system 
M at the initial time 1. 
                                                 
6 UNESCO database http://stats.uis.unesco.org/unesco.  
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We assume a constant number of 1000 dynasties. We start from an initial situation 
in which 80% of the parents are uniformly distributed over the interval ] ] 0,1.029  and 
20% are uniformly distributed over the interval ] ] 1.029,1.49746 . These values are 
chosen to have a human capital distribution consistent with the European situation in 
the early seventies. 
The initial distribution of human capital once determined, the selection thresholds 
U λ  for each of the three systems (E, I and M) can be calculated to generate the desired 
proportion of a generation going to the university at the initial time (see Table 2).  
The egalitarian system leads to the following situation at the initial time: 54% of 
people with basic education only, 26% of people who pursue vocational studies, and 
20% of people going to university. In the elitist system, 80% of the population have 
basic education only, 15% pursue vocational studies and 5% go to university at the 
initial time. Finally, these proportions are respectively 69%, 21% and 10% in system M.  
6.2. The results 
Table 3 describes the characteristics of the three steady states, and Figures 3-5 the 
corresponding human capital dynamics for the 1000 dynasties. 
The education trap vanishes in both the egalitarian and the medium systems, at 
generation 4 for the former and generation 7 for the latter. In contrast, the under 
education trap is maintained in the elitist system, and it still accounts for 76% of the 
dynasties at the steady state. Vocational studies and the university respectively represent 
25% and 75% of a generation at the steady state in both scenarios E and M, whereas 
these proportions are 19% and 5% in I. Finally, E and M lead to a quasi equality of the 
lifetime incomes for all individuals at the steady state (individuals with a university level 
have a higher human capital than those from vocational studies, but this is almost fully 
offset by their working time that is lower).  
 
Table 3. The steady states characteristics 
 Egalitarian  Elitist  In-between 
Number of segments  
at the steady state  2 3  2 
() ˆˆˆ ,, TVU µµµ   (0, 0.253, 0.747)  (0.763, 0.187, 0.05)  (0, 0.253, 0.747)
() ˆˆˆ ,, TVU hhh   (-, 1.82, 2.06 )  (0.765, 0.919, 2.325)  (-, 1.322, 1.497) 
Generation when  
the trap disappears  4
th  never  7
th 
Product per capita at 
the steady state ( ˆ y )  1.705 0.837  1.236 
() ˆˆ ˆˆ /, / UT UV I II I*  (-, 1.04)  (2.53, 2.32)  (-, 1.04) 
*  ˆ ,, , , i Ii T V U =  is the steady state lifetime income corresponding to the educational choice i.  
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Figure 3. Segmentation in the Egalitarian educational system (E) 
 
 
Figure 4. Segmentation in the Elitist educational system (I) 
 
 
Figure 5. Segmentation in the system in-between (M) 
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7. Conclusion 
We have constructed a stylised model that portrays the main features of 
educational systems and can be declined in several configurations. We have determined 
the characteristics of the related possible intergenerational dynamics and shown that the 
educational system characteristics combined with the initial distribution of human 
capital across individuals can generate very different social stratifications, with under 
education traps. This is because individuals from unskilled families attain a low human 
capital level at the end of basic education, this level being a key factor determining their 
performance in higher education. They therefore have no incentive to pursue further 
education because the related cost is higher than the related income benefit. Simulations 
have finally been implemented to illustrate these findings. The simulations portray two 
ideal-type systems, one egalitarian and the other elitist, and we also analyse a system in-
between. The egalitarian system results in two-segment stratification, quasi income 
equality and no under education trap whereas the elitist system generates three 
segments, significant inequality and a large under education trap. This modelling could 
be extended (e.g., by inserting a larger choice for individuals so as to be closer to reality) 
and applied to the analysis of the existing systems. In particular, a distinction could be 
made between Scandinavian systems that provide between 7 and 8% of their GDP for 
education with a rather large share allocated to higher education and a rather low 
selection, and Southern European systems allocating 4-5% of their GDP to education, 
the expenses being centred on primary education. The model can also generate 
endogenous growth even for 21 β η + <  if we assume human capital externalities in the 
production and/or the education function, or by adding an R&D activity that utilises 
human capital. Finally, the model could be extended to compare the welfare impacts of 
different educational systems and to analyse public strategies that combine successive 
educational systems.  
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Appendix 1  
Proof of Lemma 4: Individual j prefers V to V if this provides her/him with a 
higher lifetime income, i.e. 
() ( ) ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1) UV
UB U U j VB V V j we e h f we e h f
ηη εε δδ δδ −− − > −− − , which gives 
after simplifying  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UV
UU U VV V ee ee
ε ε δδ −> − . Identically, the condition for 
individual l to prefer V to V is 
() () ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) ( 1) (1 ) ( 1) VU
VB V V l UB U U l we e h we e h
η η εε δδ δδ −− > − − , which gives after 
simplifying  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) VU
VV V UU U ee ee
ε ε δδ −> −. The coexistence of individuals who 
prefer V to V with individuals who prefer V to U is thus impossible. Hence, the 
coexistence of individuals who select U with individuals who select V is possible in two 
cases only: (i) if the individuals who select V prefer U but are impeached to enter the 
university because of threshold  U λ , and (ii) if, for everyone, choosing U and V 
provides the same lifetime earning, which implies  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UV
UU U VV V ee ee
ε ε δδ −= − . In 
the later case, the individuals who select V can be or no be constrained by threshold 
U λ  for their entry into the university. Thus, when at least one individual who selects V 
is above threshold  U λ , U and V must be equally profitable to each individual. 
Appendix 2  
Proof of Lemma 5: Everyone prefers the university to vocational studies when 
,, , , ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ,    Uj U Vj V Uj U Vj V we h f we h f e h e h j −− > −− ⇔ −> − ∀ . By inserting 
, j U h  and  , j V h  as defined by (9) into this inequality, it comes: 
1/
ˆ () ( 1 )










>≡ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. Identically, everyone prefers vocational studies to the 
university if  / VU µ µρ <  , and both studies are equally profitable if  / VU µ µρ = . 
Appendix 3 
Reducing the number of individuals inside the under education trap consists in 
lowering  ( )
1/ 1/ ˆˆ (1 ) ( (1 ) 1) V
BV VV hk ee
η ε η τδ δ
−
=− − − . By inserting (6) and (7) into this 
expression we obtain: 
() ()() ( )
1/ 1/ 2 1/
11 ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) ( / ) V B
BB B V V V V V hk e q ee q y y
η η ββ εβ β ηβ β ε τδ δ µ τ τ
− − − −
−− =− − − .  





























addition  // 0 VB hq hq ∂∂< ∂∂<  and the sign of  / h τ ∂ ∂  is ambiguous.  
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,  /0 U h τ ∂∂ <  and  1 /0 U hy − ∂ ∂< . 
Appendix 5  
Proof of Feature (4) of Proposition 2: As  ( )
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ VVV hA y
η ββ µ
− − =  and 
()
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ UUU hA y
η ββ µ












⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
The dynasties inside segment V remain in V and those inside U remain in U in 
two cases:  
1) when  ˆ ˆˆ
VUU hhh << and 
( ) ( )
22
11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UU t U i VV t V i w e A y hf w e A y hf
ηη ββ ββ µµ −−











≥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
, and thus 









− − ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ − ⎜⎟ =≤ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ − ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
2) when  ˆ ˆ
VU hh >  and selecting V or U is indifferent for both the individuals in V 
and U, i.e.  ( ) ( )
22
11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UU t U i VV t V i we A y h we A y h
η η ββ ββ µµ −−
−− −= − ,  , iV U =  











= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 , and thus 








= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
Inequality  ( )( )
22
11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UU t U i VV t V i we A y h we A y h
η η ββ ββ µµ −−
−− −≥ −  always 











≥ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. 
Proof of Lemma 6: The steady state lifetime income is lower for the dynasties in 
segment V than for these in segment U if and only if  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UU VV eh eh −> − . In all 
























⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎜⎟ = ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
, then  
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≤ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
, and after rearranging 
/(1 ) ˆ ˆˆ (1 ) 1



















< ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 since  ˆˆ 1 UV ee >> . Hence  ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) (1 ) UU VV eh eh −> − . 
Appendix 6 
Equations (10)-(12) and Figure 2 in the text describe the dynamics of the 
dynasties depending on their segment (T, V, or U). In each of the possible three 
segments, the individual dynamics converge towards the same human capital level. To 
analyse the different possible outcomes of these dynamics, let us suppose that all the 
dynasties belonging to one segment have the same human capital at each period of time 
(this human capital changing with time). Assuming this, there are three dynamics only 
which are as follows: 
• For the dynasties inside the under education trap: 
() 1 () ( 1 ) TT t T tt hA y h
η β
− − =         ( A 1 )  
• For the dynasties following vocational studies: 
() ( )
2
1 () () ( 1 ) VV t V V tt t hA y h
β η β µ
−
− − =       ( A 2 )  
• For the dynasties having a university degree: 
() ( )
2
1 () () ( 1 ) UU tU U t ht A y ht
β η β µ
−
− =−       ( A 3 )  
with: 
() 1 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) (1 ) (1 ) tT T V V V U U U tt tt tt yh e h e h ωµ µ µ − −− −− −− =+ −+ −  (A4) 
By inserting (A4) into (A1)-(A3), and after rearranging, it comes: 
()
1 (1 ) (1 ) ()
(1 )

















    ( A 5 )  
()
2
21 (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
()

















    ( A 6 )   








21 (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
()

















    ( A 7 )  
with  TT BA β ω = ,  ()
2 () VV V t BA
β β ωµ
− = ,  ()
2 () UU U t BA
β β ωµ
− =  , 
(1 ) TT t a µ − = ,  (1 ) ˆ (1 ) VV V t ae µ − =− , and  (1 ) ˆ (1 ) UU U t ae µ − = − .  
Combining (A2) and (A3) yields: 
() ( 1 )













         ( A 8 )  
From (A8), it is clear that  ()/ () VU tt hh  tends towards the steady value 
()
1/1 / VU BB
η − . Hence, any steady state is such that: 
1 1




VV V VV U











== ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
      ( A 9 )  
In addition, suppose that at the steady state the dynasties in segment V are not 
constrained by the barrier to entry in the university, i.e.  ˆ ˆ
VU hh ≥ . Then, we know from 
Proposition 2 that 





















= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
. Relations (A5)-
(A7) form a three-equation dynamic system that depends on the values 2β η +  and 
β η + .  
1) First case: 21 β η +< . As 21 0 β η + −< , functions (A5)-(A7) are respectively 
decreasing in  () 1, , , i t hi T V U − = . The possible outcomes of these dynamics are 
depicted on Figures A1.  
In Cases (a) and (b), the dynamics result in three-segment steady states ( ˆ ˆ
T hh < ). 
In the case (a), certain dynasties would select the university if they were not prevented 
for this by the level of the barrier to entry ( ˆ ˆ
VU hh < ). As a consequence, for the values 
ˆ
V h  and  ˆ













< ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 (Proposition 2). In case (b), the dynasties who select 
vocational studies are not constrained by the selection for university ( ˆ ˆ
VU hh > ). Then,  
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individuals are indifferent between V and U
7; hence 





















= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
 (Proposition 2).  
 
Figures A1. Phase diagrams when 21 β η + <  
 
 
In cases (c) and (d), the total income per capita is high enough to make all 
dynasties go out of the under education trap. Then, two segments only subsist. Case (c) 
corresponds to the situation in which certain dynasties would leave vocational studies 
for the university if they were not constrained by the barrier  ˆ
U h , and case (d) to the 
situation where they are not constrained  ˆ ˆ
VU hh ≥  and thus indifferent between V and 












= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠
,  ˆˆ 1 UV µ µ =− , 
                                                 
7 The individuals in V are indifferent between V and U, but the individuals in U earn more that those in 
V because their parents have higher human capital (Lemma 6).   
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()
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ VVV hA y
η ββ µ
− − = ,  ( )
1/(1 ) 2 ˆ ˆˆ UUU hA y
η ββ µ
− − =  and 
() ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) VV V UU U ye h e h ωµ µ =− + − . This defines one unique possible two-segment 
steady state  () () { } ˆˆ ˆˆ ,, , VV UU hh µµ  with  ˆ ˆ
VU hh ≥ .  
In Cases (e) and (f), nobody enters the university. This corresponds to  ˆ ˆ
UU hh <  
for the smallest possible value of  U µ , i.e.  1/ U M µ = . The educational system must 
thereby be waived. This rather unlikely case corresponds to an extremely high barrier to 
entry  U λ  or/and an extremely low allowance to the university. 
2) Second case: 21 β η += . Since 21 0 β η + −=, equations (A5)-(A7) become:  
()
1 (1 ) (1 ) ()
(1 )

















   (A10) 
2
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )














     (A11) 
2
(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )














     (A12) 
It is clear that, in the case  0 VU qq = = , equations (A6) and (A7) disappear and 













β η β + −
−
−
= , which generates the unique 
stable steady state  ()
1 ˆ ˆ ,1 TT T T ha B
βη β µ
−− ⎧⎫ == ⎨⎬
⎩⎭
.  
We now analyse the cases with  0, , i qi V U >=  ( 0 B q >  by definition). 
1. Let us firstly suppose that the distribution of human capital across the dynasties 
makes the income per capita increase. Hence, (i) all the dynasties get out of the under 
education trap resulting in a two-segment stratification , and (ii) all the dynasties inside 
segment V (these selecting vocational studies) are no longer constrained by the barrier 
to university  U λ . In such a situation, the system (A10)-(A12) becomes:  
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       ( A 1 3 )  
2
(1 )















       ( A 1 4 )  
Since there are two segments and the dynasties are not constrained by threshold 
U λ , we have  () 1 () UV tt µ µ =−  and 
1/
ˆ () ( 1 )









= ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠






































Consequently, there is a permanent segmentation with proportions () ˆˆ , VU µµ  and 
this fully determines the values  i B  and  i a  ,  , iV U = .  
By combining (A13) and (A14), we generate the following implicit function: 
11 1 1
22 2 2
( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
() () () ()
0 VU V U
UU VV
VU V U tt t t





⎛⎞ ⎛⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
−−= ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (A15) 
Because of (A8), we know that the only solution consistent with the dynamics is 
such that 





= . Inserting 
(1 )
()







≡=  into (A15), the implicit 
function becomes  () ()
1/2 1/2 1/ 0 UU VV aB aB
ββ β λλ λ −−= , with the solution: 
  ()
2 1/2 1/2
UU VV aB aB
β ββ λ =+  
Both  () V ht  and  () U ht  grow at the same steady rate 
()
2 1/2 1/2 ˆ 1 UU VV aB aB
β ββ γ =+ − , as well as the income per capita 
() ˆˆ ˆˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) tV V V U U U ye h t e h t ωµ µ =− + − . Finally for such a dynamics to occur, 
condition ()
2 1/2 1/2 1 UU VV aB aB
β ββ +>  must be fulfilled.  
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2. When the distribution of human capital across dynasties makes the income per 
capita decrease, this moves upwards the entry threshold  U h  and downwards the human 
capital in segment U,  () U ht . From a certain time, nobody can enter the university, 
making this segment disappear as well as the Educational system (since it is no longer 
possible to maintain  0 U q >  without violating the efficiency condition).  
3. Finally the dynamic system (A10)-(A12) may theoretically generate unstable 
steady states with two (V and U) or three (T, V and U) segments, but this outcome is 
very unlikely.    
3) Third case: 21 β η +> . In this case, the functions  (1 ) ()/,  , ii t t hh i V U − = , are 
increasing in  (1 ) i t h −  and equal to 0 for  (1 )0 i t h − =  (relations A6 and A7). In contrast, 
function  () ( 1 ) / TT tt hh −  can be either decreasing or increasing in  (1 ) T t h − , depending 
on the sign of β η + . Figures A2(a) and A2(b) depict the former case, and A2(c) and 
A2(d) the latter. 
 





1. Figure A2(a) depicts the case 21 β η + >  and  1 β η + <  when the distribution 
of human capital across the dynasties results in a growing income per capita, making 
thereby the under education trap empty and the barrier to university inoperative. Since 
there are two segments and the dynasties are not constrained by threshold  U λ , we have 
for the same reason as in case 21 β η + = :  
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In addition, for the same reason as in case 21 β η + = , both  () V ht and  () V ht , and 
thus the income per capita y(t), grow at the same rate. Since  (1 ) ()/,  , ii t t hh i V U − =  is 
increasing in  (1 ) i t h − , the growth rate is increasing with time (growth is explosive).  
2. Figure A2(b) depicts the case 21 β η + >  and  1 β η + <  when the distribution 
of human capital across the dynasties results in a declining income per capita, making 
thereby threshold  U h  increase and the human capital in segment U decrease, emptying 
thereby the university. When there is no student in the university, the educational 
system cancels.  
3. Figure A2(c) depicts the case  1 β η + >  when the distribution of human capital 
across the dynasties results in a growing income per capita. The dynamics is the same as 
in case (a).  
4. Figure A2(d) examines the case  1 β η + >  when the distribution of human 
capital across the dynasties results in a decreasing income per capita. This typically 
results in the collapse of the educational system because segment U turns out to be 
empty sooner or later. It can be noted that, once the levies have been redistributed 
between vocational studies and basic education, the decline in y(t) may well continue, 
leading to the disappearing of vocational studies and subsequently to the fall of 
everyone into the under education trap.  
5. Finally, as in the case 21 β η + = , the only stable steady state occurs when 
0 VU qq ==  and  1 β η +< , and this is characterised by the couple 
()
1 ˆ ˆ ,1 TT T T ha B
βη β µ
−− ⎧⎫ == ⎨⎬
⎩⎭
.  
 